全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w22771
来源ID	Working Paper 22771
	Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions
	John Asker; Heski Bar-Isaac
发表日期	2016-10-31
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	We consider vertical contracts where the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum advertised price restrictions (MAP) act as a restraint on customers’ information and so can increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints, thereby, soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that they can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers; encouraging service provision; and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM or to the absence of such restrictions.
主题	Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior ; Antitrust
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w22771
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580444
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	John Asker,Heski Bar-Isaac. Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anti-Competitive Impacts of Minimum Advertised Price Restrictions. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w22771.pdf（615KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览