| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22772 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22772 |
| Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision | |
| T. Renee Bowen; George Georgiadis; Nicolas S. Lambert | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent’s preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent’s degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22772 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580445 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | T. Renee Bowen,George Georgiadis,Nicolas S. Lambert. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22772.pdf（1363KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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