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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22785
来源IDWorking Paper 22785
Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge
George-Marios Angeletos; Chen Lian
发表日期2016-10-31
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general-equilibrium effects of news and rationalizes a form of myopia at the aggregate level. We establish these insights within a class of games which nests, but is not limited to, the New Keynesian model. Our results help resolve the forward-guidance puzzle, offer a rationale for the front-loading of fiscal stimuli, and illustrate more broadly the fragility of predictions that rest on long series of forward-looking feedback loops.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22785
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580458
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GB/T 7714
George-Marios Angeletos,Chen Lian. Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge. 2016.
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