| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22785 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22785 |
| Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge | |
| George-Marios Angeletos; Chen Lian | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-10-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general-equilibrium effects of news and rationalizes a form of myopia at the aggregate level. We establish these insights within a class of games which nests, but is not limited to, the New Keynesian model. Our results help resolve the forward-guidance puzzle, offer a rationale for the front-loading of fiscal stimuli, and illustrate more broadly the fragility of predictions that rest on long series of forward-looking feedback loops. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22785 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580458 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George-Marios Angeletos,Chen Lian. Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22785.pdf（573KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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