| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22794 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22794 |
| Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy | |
| George-Marios Angeletos; Fabrice Collard; Harris Dellas | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal policy in an economy in which public debt is used as collateral or liquidity buffer. Issuing more public debt raises welfare by easing the underlying financial friction; but this easing lowers the liquidity premium and increases the government’s cost of borrowing. These considerations, which are absent in the basic Ramsey paradigm, help pin down a unique, long-run level of public debt. They require a front-loaded tax response to government-spending shocks, instead of tax smoothing. And they explain why a financial recession, more than a traditional one, makes government borrowing cheaper, optimally supporting larger fiscal stimuli. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Macroeconomics ; Macroeconomic Models ; Business Cycles ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22794 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580468 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George-Marios Angeletos,Fabrice Collard,Harris Dellas. Public Debt as Private Liquidity: Optimal Policy. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22794.pdf（700KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
