| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22803 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22803 |
| E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India | |
| Abhijit Banerjee; Esther Duflo; Clement Imbert; Santhosh Mathew; Rohini Pande | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, we conducted a large-scale experiment to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials’ self-reported median personal assets fell. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Development and Growth |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22803 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580475 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Abhijit Banerjee,Esther Duflo,Clement Imbert,et al. E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22803.pdf（815KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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