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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22814
来源IDWorking Paper 22814
Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes
Francesco Decarolis; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Riccardo Pacini
发表日期2016-11-14
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Reputational incentives may be a powerful mechanism for improving supplier performance and limiting the perverse effect of price competition on contract execution. We analyze a unique experiment run by a large utility company in Italy which introduced a new vendor rating system scoring its suppliers' past performance and linking it to the award of future contracts. We study responses in both price and performance to the announcement of the switch from price-only to price-and-rating auctions. Average performance improves from 25 percent to 90 percent of the audited parameters. Improvements involve all parameters and suppliers, are long-lasting (for at least 10 years after the initial experiment) and are reflected in higher service quality by the utility. Contract prices do not significantly change overall, but we find evidence of lower prices right after the announcement when suppliers compete to win contracts to get scored, and of higher prices, once they have established a good reputation. We then argue that supplier moral hazard is the main force behind our findings. The main takeaway from this study is that the gains from curtailing supplier moral hazard may be higher than those from always bolstering price competition, and that a reputational mechanism based on objective past performance can be a powerful tool to achieve this goal.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior ; Industry Studies
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22814
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580488
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GB/T 7714
Francesco Decarolis,Giancarlo Spagnolo,Riccardo Pacini. Past Performance and Procurement Outcomes. 2016.
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