| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22836 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22836 |
| The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing | |
| John Asker; Chaim Fershtman; Jihye Jeon; Ariel Pakes | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-14 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the impact of information sharing between rivals in a dynamic auction with asymmetric information. Firms bid in sequential auctions to obtain inputs. Their inventory of inputs, determined by the results of past auctions, are privately known state variables that determine bidding incentives. The model is analyzed numerically under different information sharing rules. The analysis uses the restricted experience based equilibrium concept of Fershtman and Pakes (2012) which we refine to mitigate multiplicity issues. We find that increased information about competitors’ states increases participation and inventories, as the firms are more able to avoid the intense competition in low inventory states. While average bids are lower, social welfare is unchanged and output is increased. Implications for the posture of antitrust regulation toward information sharing agreements are discussed. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22836 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580510 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Asker,Chaim Fershtman,Jihye Jeon,et al. The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22836.pdf（364KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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