| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22842 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22842 |
| Multilateral Trade Bargaining and Dominant Strategies | |
| Kyle Bagwell; Robert W. Staiger | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-11-21 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by GATT bargaining behavior and renegotiation rules, we construct a three-country, two-good general-equilibrium model of trade and examine multilateral tariff bargaining under the constraints of non-discrimination and multilateral reciprocity. We allow for a general family of government preferences and identify bargaining outcomes that can be implemented using dominant strategy proposals for all countries. In the implementation, tariff proposals are followed by multilateral rebalancing, a sequence that is broadly consistent with observed patterns identified by Bagwell, Staiger and Yurukoglu (2016) in the bargaining records for the GATT Torquay Round. The resulting bargaining outcome is efficient relative to government preferences if and only if the initial tariff vectors position the initial world price at its "politically optimal" level. In symmetric settings, if the initial tariffs correspond to Nash tariffs, then the resulting bargaining outcome is efficient and ensures greater-than-Nash trade volumes and welfares for all countries. We also highlight relationships between our work and previous research that examines strategy-proof rationing rules in other economic settings. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22842 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580516 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kyle Bagwell,Robert W. Staiger. Multilateral Trade Bargaining and Dominant Strategies. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22842.pdf（429KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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