| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22873 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22873 |
| How do Hospitals Respond to Payment Incentives? | |
| Gautam Gowrisankaran; Keith A. Joiner; Jianjing Lin | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-05 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A recent literature finds that hospitals “upcode” when doing so increases revenues, suggesting that incomplete information creates substantial distortions. However, reporting complete information is itself costly. We examine the impact of both revenues and coding costs on hospital billing practices for Medicare inpatients. Following the literature, we investigate the fraction of patients top coded as the revenues from top coding vary. We then examine how this fraction changes following Medicare reforms—which increased the requirements and complexity to justify top codes—interacted with hospital electronic medical record adoption—which may decrease coding costs. We find evidence that coding costs drive top coding behavior. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22873 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580547 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gautam Gowrisankaran,Keith A. Joiner,Jianjing Lin. How do Hospitals Respond to Payment Incentives?. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22873.pdf（452KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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