| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22876 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22876 |
| Insurers' Response to Selection Risk: Evidence from Medicare Enrollment Reforms | |
| Francesco Decarolis; Andrea Guglielmo | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-05 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Evidence on insurers’ behavior in environments with both risk selection and market power is largely missing. We fill this gap by providing one of the first empirical accounts of how insurers adjust plan features when faced with potential changes in selection. Our strategy exploits a 2012 reform allowing Medicare enrollees to switch to 5-star contracts at anytime. This policy increased enrollment into 5-star contracts, but without risk selection worsening. Our findings show that this is due to 5-star plans lowering both premiums and generosity, thus becoming more appealing for most beneficiaries, but less so for those in worse health conditions. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22876 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580550 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Decarolis,Andrea Guglielmo. Insurers' Response to Selection Risk: Evidence from Medicare Enrollment Reforms. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22876.pdf（1246KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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