| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22911 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22911 |
| Corrective Policy and Goodhart's Law: The Case of Carbon Emissions from Automobiles | |
| Mathias Reynaert; James M. Sallee | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-12 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. We show theoretically that such gaming can benefit consumers, even when it induces them to make mistakes, because gaming leads to lower prices by reducing costs. We use our insights to quantify the welfare effect of gaming in fuel-consumption ratings for automobiles, which we show increased sharply following aggressive policy reforms. We estimate a structural model of the car market and derive empirical analogs of the price effects and choice distortions identified by theory. We find that price effects outweigh distortions; on net, consumers benefit from gaming. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22911 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580584 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mathias Reynaert,James M. Sallee. Corrective Policy and Goodhart's Law: The Case of Carbon Emissions from Automobiles. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22911.pdf（601KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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