| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w22936
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 22936
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| Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification |
| Marina Halac; Pierre Yared
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| 发表日期 | 2016-12-19
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| 出版年 | 2016
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We introduce costly verification into a general delegation framework. A principal faces an agent who is better informed about the efficient action but biased towards higher actions. An audit verifies the agent’s information, but is costly. The principal chooses a permissible action set as a function of the audit decision and result. We show that if the audit cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent can select any action up to a threshold, or request audit and the efficient action if the threshold is sufficiently binding. For higher audit costs, the principal may instead prefer auditing only intermediate actions. However, if the principal cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the audit decision and result, TEC is always optimal. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for the use of TEC in practice, including in capital budgeting in organizations, fiscal policy, and consumption-savings problems. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Economics of Information
; Macroeconomics
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22936
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580609
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification. 2016.
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文件名：
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w22936.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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