| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22947 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22947 |
| Growth Policy, Agglomeration, and (the Lack of) Competition | |
| Wyatt J. Brooks; Joseph P. Kaboski; Yao Amber Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-19 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Industrial clusters are promoted by policy and generally viewed as good for growth and development, but both clusters and policies may also enable non-competitive behavior. This paper studies the presence of non-competitive pricing in geographic industrial clusters. We develop, validate, and apply a novel test for collusive behavior. We derive the test from the solution to a partial cartel of perfectly colluding firms in an industry. Outside of a cartel, a firm's markup depends on its market share, but in the cartel, markups across firms converge and depend instead on the total market share of the cartel. Empirically, we validate the test using plants with common owners, and then test for collusion using data from Chinese manufacturing firms (1999-2009). We find strong evidence for non-competitive pricing within a subset of industrial clusters, and we find the level of non-competitive pricing is about four times higher in Chinese special economic zones than outside those zones. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Development ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Regional Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22947 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580620 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wyatt J. Brooks,Joseph P. Kaboski,Yao Amber Li. Growth Policy, Agglomeration, and (the Lack of) Competition. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22947.pdf（693KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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