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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w22966
来源IDWorking Paper 22966
Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off
Charles M. Cameron; John M. de Figueiredo; David E. Lewis
发表日期2016-12-26
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition.
主题Public Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22966
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580640
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Charles M. Cameron,John M. de Figueiredo,David E. Lewis. Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off. 2016.
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