| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22966 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22966 |
| Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off | |
| Charles M. Cameron; John M. de Figueiredo; David E. Lewis | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-26 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22966 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580640 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles M. Cameron,John M. de Figueiredo,David E. Lewis. Public Sector Personnel Economics: Wages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22966.pdf（435KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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