全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w22968
来源ID	Working Paper 22968
	The Political Economy of Weak Treaties
	Marco Battaglini; Bård Harstad
发表日期	2016-12-26
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	In recent decades, democratic countries have signed hundreds of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Most of these agreements, however, are weak: they generally do not include effective enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. This is a puzzle in standard economic models. To study this phenomenon, we propose a positive theory of IEAs in which the political incumbents negotiate them in the shadow of reelection concerns. We show that, in these environments, incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are simultaneously overambitious (larger than what they would be without electoral concerns) and weak (might not be implemented in full). The theory also provides a new perspective for understanding investments in green technologies, highlighting a channel through which countries are tempted to rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to make compliance credible. We present preliminary evidence consistent with these predictions.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w22968
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580642
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Battaglini,Bård Harstad. The Political Economy of Weak Treaties. 2016.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w22968.pdf（532KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览