| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w22975 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 22975 |
| Populism and the Return of the \u201cParanoid Style\u201d: Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal | |
| Rafael Di Tella; Julio J. Rotemberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-12-26 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a simple model of populism as the rejection of “disloyal” leaders. We show that adding the assumption that people are worse off when they experience low income as a result of leader betrayal (than when it is the result of bad luck) to a simple voter choice model yields a preference for incompetent leaders. These deliver worse material outcomes in general, but they reduce the feelings of betrayal during bad times. Some evidence consistent with our model is gathered from the Trump-Clinton 2016 election: on average, subjects primed with the importance of competence in policymaking decrease their support for Trump, the candidate who scores lower on competence in our survey. But two groups respond to the treatment with a large (between 5 and 7 percentage points) increase in their support for Donald Trump: those living in rural areas and those that are low educated, white and living in urban and suburban areas. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w22975 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580649 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rafael Di Tella,Julio J. Rotemberg. Populism and the Return of the \u201cParanoid Style\u201d: Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w22975.pdf（655KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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