| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w23026
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23026
|
| Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-09
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This article considers the social desirability of prison work programs in a model in which the function of imprisonment is to deter crime. Two types of prison work programs are studied—voluntary ones and mandatory ones. A voluntary work program generates net social benefits: if prisoners are paid a wage that just compensates them for their disutility from work, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence is unaffected, but society obtains the product of the work program. But a mandatory work program yields even higher net social benefits: if prisoners are forced to work without compensation, the deterrent effect of the prison sentence rises, allowing society to restore deterrence and save resources by reducing the probability of detection or the sentence length, and also to obtain greater output than under the optimal voluntary work program. In an extension of the basic analysis, however, in which prisoners vary in their disutility from work, a voluntary work program may be superior to a mandatory work program because prisoners with relatively high disutility from work can elect not to work. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
; Labor Economics
; Labor Market Structures
; Other
; Law and Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23026
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580699
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
A. Mitchell Polinsky. Prison Work Programs in a Model of Deterrence. 2017.
|
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文件名：
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w23026.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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