| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23055 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23055 |
| Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles | |
| Douglas W. Diamond; Yunzhi Hu; Raghuram G. Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Why do firms choose high debt when they anticipate high valuations, and underperform subsequently? We propose a theory of financing cycles where the importance of creditors’ control rights over cash flows (“pledgeability”) varies with industry liquidity. The market allows firms take on more debt when they anticipate higher future liquidity. However, both high anticipated liquidity and the resulting high debt limit their incentives to enhance pledgeability. This has prolonged adverse effects in a downturn. Because these effects are hard to contract upon, higher anticipated liquidity can also reduce a firm’s current access to finance. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23055 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580729 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Douglas W. Diamond,Yunzhi Hu,Raghuram G. Rajan. Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23055.pdf（605KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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