| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23073 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23073 |
| Optimal Social Security Claiming Behavior under Lump Sum Incentives: Theory and Evidence | |
| Raimond Maurer; Olivia S. Mitchell; Ralph Rogalla; Tatjana Schimetschek | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-23 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23073 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580747 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raimond Maurer,Olivia S. Mitchell,Ralph Rogalla,et al. Optimal Social Security Claiming Behavior under Lump Sum Incentives: Theory and Evidence. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23073.pdf（399KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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