全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23091
来源ID	Working Paper 23091
	How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?
	Kelly Shue; Richard Townsend
发表日期	2017-01-30
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at-the-money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10 percent increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8–4.2 percent increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.
主题	Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23091
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580765
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kelly Shue,Richard Townsend. How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?. 2017.