全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's \u201cDeath Ceiling\u201d Program

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23098
来源ID	Working Paper 23098
	The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's \u201cDeath Ceiling\u201d Program
	Raymond Fisman; Yongxiang Wang
发表日期	2017-01-30
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We study a 2004 program designed to motivate Chinese bureaucrats to reduce accidental deaths. Each province received a set of ‘death ceilings’ that, if exceeded, would impede government officials' promotions. For each category of accidental deaths, we observe a sharp discontinuity in reported deaths at the ceiling, suggestive of manipulation. Provinces with safety incentives for municipal officials experienced larger declines in accidental deaths, suggesting complementarities between incentives at different levels of government. While realized accidental deaths predict the following year's ceiling, we observe no evidence that provinces manipulate deaths upward to avoid ratchet effects in the setting of death ceilings.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Subnational Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23098
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580772
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Raymond Fisman,Yongxiang Wang. The Distortionary Effects of Incentives in Government: Evidence from China's \u201cDeath Ceiling\u201d Program. 2017.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w23098.pdf（414KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览