| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23100 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23100 |
| Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals | |
| Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein; Neale Mahoney | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-01-30 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting – a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,000) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient's stay reaches a threshold number of days. The descriptive evidence indicates that discharges increase substantially after the threshold, and that the marginal patient discharged after the threshold is in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. When we conservatively limit ourselves to alternative contracts that hold the LTCH harmless, we find that an alternative contract can generate Medicare savings of about $2,100 per admission, or about 5% of total payments. More aggressive payment reforms can generate substantially greater savings, but the accompanying reduction in LTCH profits has potential out-of-sample consequences. Our results highlight how improved financial incentives may be able to reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for industry profits or patient health. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23100 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580774 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Liran Einav,Amy Finkelstein,Neale Mahoney. Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23100.pdf（1117KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
