全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Price-Linked Subsidies and Imperfect Competition in Health Insurance

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23104
来源ID	Working Paper 23104
	Price-Linked Subsidies and Imperfect Competition in Health Insurance
	Sonia P. Jaffe; Mark Shepard
发表日期	2017-01-30
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	Policymakers subsidizing health insurance often face uncertainty about future market prices. We study the implications of one policy response: linking subsidies to prices, to target a given post-subsidy premium. We show that these price-linked subsidies weaken competition, raising prices for the government and/or consumers. However, price-linking also ties subsidies to health care cost shocks, which may be desirable. Evaluating this tradeoffs empirically using a model estimated with Massachusetts insurance exchange data, we find that price-linking increases prices 1-6%, and much more in less competitive markets. For cost uncertainty reasonable in a mature market, these losses outweigh the benefits of price-linking.
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23104
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580778
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Sonia P. Jaffe,Mark Shepard. Price-Linked Subsidies and Imperfect Competition in Health Insurance. 2017.