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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23123
来源IDWorking Paper 23123
When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana versus the UK
Elwyn Davies; Marcel Fafchamps
发表日期2017-02-06
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要Experimental evidence to date supports the double theoretical prediction that parties transacting repeatedly punish bad contractual performance by reducing future offers, and that the threat of punishment disciplines opportunistic breach. We conduct a repeated gift-exchange experiment with university students in Ghana and the UK. The experiment is framed as an employment contract. Each period the employer makes an irrevocable wage offer to the worker who then chooses an effort level. UK subjects behave in line with theoretical predictions and previous experiments: wage offers reward high effort and punish low effort; this induces workers to choose high effort; and gains from trade are shared between workers and employers. We do not find such evidence among Ghanaian subjects: employers do not reduce wage offers after low effort; workers often choose low effort; and employers earn zero payoffs on average. These results also hold if we use a strategy method to elicit wage offers. Introducing competition or reputation does not significantly improve workers' effort. Using a structural bounds approach, we find that the share of selfish workers in Ghana is not substantially different from the UK or earlier experiments. We conclude that strategic punishment in repeated labor transactions is not a universally shared heuristic.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Development and Growth ; Development
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23123
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580797
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GB/T 7714
Elwyn Davies,Marcel Fafchamps. When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana versus the UK. 2017.
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