| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23177 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23177 |
| Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System | |
| Brigham Frandsen; Michael Powell; James B. Rebitzer | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a "common-agency" model for explaining inefficient contracting in the U.S. healthcare system. In our setting, common-agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a shared provider to invest in improved care coordination. Our approach differs from other common-agency models in that we analyze "sticking points," that is, equilibria in which payers coordinate around Pareto-dominated contracts that do not offer providers incentives to implement efficient investments. These sticking points offer a straightforward explanation for three long observed but hard to explain features of the U.S. healthcare system: the ubiquity of fee-for-service contracting arrangements outside of Medicare; problematic care coordination; and the historic reliance on small, single specialty practices rather than larger multi-specialty group practices to deliver care. The common-agency model also provides insights on the effects of policies, such as Accountable Care Organizations, that aim to promote more efficient forms of contracting between payers and providers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23177 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580850 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brigham Frandsen,Michael Powell,James B. Rebitzer. Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23177.pdf（464KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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