全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Political Cycles and Stock Returns

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w23184
来源ID	Working Paper 23184
	Political Cycles and Stock Returns
	Lubos Pastor; Pietro Veronesi
发表日期	2017-02-20
出版年	2017
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democrat or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats—the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts higher average stock market returns under Democratic presidencies, explaining the well-known “presidential puzzle.” The model can also explain why economic growth has been faster under Democratic presidencies. In the data, Democratic voters are more risk- averse and risk aversion declines during Democratic presidencies. Public workers vote Democrat while entrepreneurs vote Republican, as the model predicts.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Economic Systems
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w23184
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580856
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lubos Pastor,Pietro Veronesi. Political Cycles and Stock Returns. 2017.