| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23188 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23188 |
| The Structure of Health Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment | |
| Mariana Carrera; Heather Royer; Mark F. Stehr; Justin R. Sydnor | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The use of incentives to encourage healthy behaviors is increasingly widespread, but we have little evidence about how best to structure these programs. We explore how different incentive designs affect behavior on the extensive and intensive margins through an experiment offering incentives to employees of a Fortune 500 company to use their workplace gym. Overall the likelihood of joining the gym was not strongly affected by the incentive design. Notably, front-loading incentives to encourage initial participation was not more effective than an incentive kept constant over time. For those who were already at least occasional users of the gym, however, we find more evidence that the design of incentives matters. For this group, front-loading incentives appears to be detrimental relative to a constant incentive, but a novel design that spreads out the incentive budget by turning incentives on and off over a longer period of time is effective. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23188 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580862 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariana Carrera,Heather Royer,Mark F. Stehr,et al. The Structure of Health Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23188.pdf（414KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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