| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23235 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23235 |
| Financial Markets and Fiscal Unions | |
| Patrick J. Kehoe; Elena Pastorino | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Do sophisticated international financial markets obviate the need for an active union-wide authority to orchestrate fiscal transfers between countries to provide adequate insurance against country-specific economic fluctuations? We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economy with no international financial markets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. With sophisticated financial markets, however, such an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a fiscal externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally, we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insurance across member countries is optimal only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue desirable policies. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23235 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580909 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick J. Kehoe,Elena Pastorino. Financial Markets and Fiscal Unions. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23235.pdf（278KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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