| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23243 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23243 |
| Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental Evaluation of Nudge Strategies | |
| Michael Chirico; Robert Inman; Charles Loeffler; John MacDonald; Holger Sieg | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-13 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Municipal governments commonly confront the problem of tardy or delinquent property tax payments. We implement an experiment in property tax collection for tardy taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia for the calendar year, 2015. The experiment sent one of seven reminder letters to the tardy taxpayers, testing the efficacy of a simple reminder, two alternative reminders stressing economic sanctions, and four alternative reminders emphasizing either that taxpayers receive neighborhood services or city-wide services for their tax payments, that most of their neighbors pay their taxes on time, or that as a citizen in a democracy it is a civic duty to pay taxes on time. Compliance behaviors were compared to a holdout sample that received no reminder letter. The most effective letters were those that threatened an economic sanction for continued non-compliance. These letters were particularly cost-effective in raising additional city revenues. There was no evidence that those receiving a reminder for the calendar year 2015 improved their tax compliance behavior in the calendar year 2016. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23243 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580917 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Chirico,Robert Inman,Charles Loeffler,et al. Deterring Property Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental Evaluation of Nudge Strategies. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23243.pdf（544KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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