| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23247 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23247 |
| Training Contracts, Employee Turnover, and the Returns from Firm-sponsored General Training | |
| Mitchell Hoffman; Stephen V. Burks | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. “Training contracts” that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we show that two training contracts significantly reduced post-training quitting, particularly when workers are approaching the end of their contracts. Simulating a structural model, we show that observed worker quit behavior exhibits aspects of optimization (for one of the two contracts), and that the contracts increased firm profits from training and reduced worker welfare relative to no contract. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Market Structures ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23247 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580921 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mitchell Hoffman,Stephen V. Burks. Training Contracts, Employee Turnover, and the Returns from Firm-sponsored General Training. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23247.pdf（247KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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