| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23265 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23265 |
| Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp | |
| Atila Abdulkadiroglu; Yeon-Koo Che; Parag A. Pathak; Alvin E. Roth; Olivier Tercieux | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school choice. In particular, TTC is a Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, but so are other mechanisms. We show that TTC is constrained-optimal in the following sense: TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when each school has one seat. When schools have more than one seat, there are multiple possible implementations of TTC. Data from New Orleans and Boston indicate that there is little difference across these versions of TTC, but significantly less justified envy compared to a serial dictatorship. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23265 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Atila Abdulkadiroglu,Yeon-Koo Che,Parag A. Pathak,et al. Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23265.pdf（480KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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