| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23273 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23273 |
| Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting | |
| Raphael Boleslavsky; Bruce I. Carlin; Christopher Cotton | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent’s credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain access to better investments. This is due to a complementarity between the agents’ effort provision and their ability to exaggerate. As such, it is suboptimal for principals to prevent misreporting, even if doing so is costless. This helps explain why exaggeration is ubiquitous during allocation decisions: money management, analyst coverage, private equity fundraising, and venture capital investments. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23273 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580947 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raphael Boleslavsky,Bruce I. Carlin,Christopher Cotton. Competing for Capital: Auditing and Credibility in Financial Reporting. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23273.pdf（337KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
