| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23288 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23288 |
| Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks | |
| Greg Buchak; Gregor Matvos; Tomasz Piskorski; Amit Seru | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-03-27 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007-2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden–capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision--all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Fintech lenders appear to offer a higher quality product and charge a premium of 14-16 basis points. Relative to other lenders, they seem to use different information to set interest rates. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23288 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/580962 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Greg Buchak,Gregor Matvos,Tomasz Piskorski,et al. Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23288.pdf（1277KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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