| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23350 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23350 |
| Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness | |
| Michael Carlos Best; Jonas Hjort; David Szakonyi | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How important are bureaucrats for the productivity of the state? And to what extent do the tradeoffs between different policies depend on the implementing bureaucrats’ effectiveness? Using data on 16million public procurement purchases in Russia during 2011–2016, we show that over 40 percent of the variation in quality-adjusted prices paid—our measure of performance—is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations that manage procurement processes. Such differences in effectiveness matter for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common procurement policy— bid preferences for domestic suppliers—dramatically improves performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Development and Growth |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23350 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581024 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Carlos Best,Jonas Hjort,David Szakonyi. Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23350.pdf（1619KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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