| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23352 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23352 |
| Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard meets Moral Preferences | |
| James Andreoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Theorists and policy analysts have convincingly argued that greater trust makes a more efficient society by eliminating costly contracts or expensive reputations. Concurrently, experiments suggest that reciprocity is a potent substitute for law when compliance with contracts is imperfectly enforced. This paper examines these issues within the context of a common trust-building contract device: satisfaction guaranteed. We find that satisfaction guaranteed indeed builds trust and improves efficiency. Interestingly, sellers offering a guarantee are more trustworthy than those who don't, even when honoring it is fully voluntary, but the guarantee only elicits the trust of buyers when it has legal backing. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23352 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581026 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James Andreoni. Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard meets Moral Preferences. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23352.pdf（552KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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