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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w23353 |
来源ID | Working Paper 23353 |
Cost of Service Regulation in U.S. Health Care: Minimum Medical Loss Ratios | |
Steve Cicala; Ethan M.J. Lieber; Victoria Marone | |
发表日期 | 2017-05-01 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully-insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives analogous to cost of service regulation. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find claims costs rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7% in the individual market, and 2% in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. |
主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23353 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581027 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steve Cicala,Ethan M.J. Lieber,Victoria Marone. Cost of Service Regulation in U.S. Health Care: Minimum Medical Loss Ratios. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w23353.pdf(593KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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