| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w23370
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 23370
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| Fiscal Rules and Sovereign Default |
| Laura Alfaro; Fabio Kanczuk
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| 发表日期 | 2017-05-01
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Recurrent concerns over debt sustainability in emerging and developed nations have prompted renewed debate on the role of fiscal rules. Their optimality, however, remains unclear. We provide a quantitative analysis of fiscal rules in a standard model of sovereign debt accumulation and default modified to incorporate quasi-hyperbolic preferences. For reasons of political economy or aggregation of citizens' preferences, government preferences are present biased, resulting in over-accumulation of debt. Calibrating this parameter with values in the literature, the model can reproduce debt levels and frequency of default typical of emerging markets even if the household impatience parameter is calibrated to local interest rates. A quantitative exercise finds welfare gains of the optimal fiscal policy to be economically substantial, and the optimal rule to not entail a countercyclical fiscal policy. A simple debt rule that limits the maximum amount of debt is analyzed and compared to a simple deficit rule that limits the maximum amount of deficit per period. Whereas the deficit rule does not perform well, the debt rule yields welfare gains virtually equal to the optimal rule. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; International Finance
; Public Economics
; National Fiscal Issues
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23370
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581044
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Laura Alfaro,Fabio Kanczuk. Fiscal Rules and Sovereign Default. 2017.
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文件名：
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w23370.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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