| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23373 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23373 |
| Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill? | |
| Markus Ibert; Ron Kaniel; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh; Roine Vestman | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level revenues and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation to manager-level revenue and performance, highlighting the importance of the mutual fund firm. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23373 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581047 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Markus Ibert,Ron Kaniel,Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh,et al. Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23373.pdf（576KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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