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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23373
来源IDWorking Paper 23373
Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?
Markus Ibert; Ron Kaniel; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh; Roine Vestman
发表日期2017-05-01
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level revenues and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation to manager-level revenue and performance, highlighting the importance of the mutual fund firm.
主题Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23373
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581047
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Markus Ibert,Ron Kaniel,Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh,et al. Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid For Investment Skill?. 2017.
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