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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w23382 |
来源ID | Working Paper 23382 |
How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action: Evidence from California\u2019s Groundwater | |
Andrew B. Ayres; Eric C. Edwards; Gary D. Libecap | |
发表日期 | 2017-05-08 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Collective action to remedy the losses of open access to common-pool resources often is late and incomplete, extending rent dissipation. Examples include persistent over-exploitation of oil fields and ocean fisheries, despite general agreement that production constraints are needed. Transaction costs encountered in assigning property rights are an explanation, but analysis of their role is limited by a lack of systematic data. We examine governance institutions in California’s 445 groundwater basins using a new dataset to identify factors that influence the adoption of extraction controls. In 309 basins, institutions allow unconstrained pumping, while an additional 105 basins have weak management plans. Twenty of these basins are severely overdrafted. Meanwhile, users in 31 basins have defined groundwater property rights, the most complete solution. We document the critical role of transaction costs in explaining this variation in responses. This research adds to the literatures on open access, transaction costs, bargaining, and property rights |
主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; History ; Other History ; Economic Systems ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Agriculture ; Renewable Resources ; Environment |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23382 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581056 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew B. Ayres,Eric C. Edwards,Gary D. Libecap. How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action: Evidence from California\u2019s Groundwater. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w23382.pdf(1166KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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