| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23436 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23436 |
| Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Paul N. Riskind | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-22 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this article we derive the mix of criminal sanctions—choosing among prison, parole, and probation—that achieves any target level of deterrence at least cost. We assume that prison has higher disutility and higher cost per unit time than parole and probation and that potential offenders discount the future disutility of sanctions at a higher rate than the state discounts the future costs of sanctions. Our primary insight is that there is a “front-loading advantage” of imprisonment due to these differential discount rates. This advantage implies that (a) whenever a sentence includes both a prison term and a parole term, the prison term should be imposed first; and (b) it may be optimal to employ a prison term even if prison has higher cost per unit of disutility than parole and probation and even if prison is not needed to achieve the target level of deterrence. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23436 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581109 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Paul N. Riskind. Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23436.pdf（236KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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