| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23473 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23473 |
| Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds | |
| Daniel Garrett; Andrey Ordin; James W. Roberts; Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-06-05 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show that this interaction can limit a bidder’s ability to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments’ borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp lowers mean borrowing costs by 9-10%. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups and to illustrate and quantify how the interaction between tax policy and bidder strategic behavior determines the impact of tax advantages on municipal borrowing costs. We use the estimated model to evaluate the efficiency of Obama and Trump administration policies that limit the tax advantage for municipal bonds. Because reductions in the tax advantage inflate bidder markups and depress competition, the resulting increase in municipal borrowing costs more than offsets the tax savings to the government. Finally, we use the model to analyze a recent non-tax regulation that affects entry into municipal bond auctions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23473 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581147 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel Garrett,Andrey Ordin,James W. Roberts,et al. Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23473.pdf（2511KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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