G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w23473
来源IDWorking Paper 23473
Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds
Daniel Garrett; Andrey Ordin; James W. Roberts; Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato
发表日期2017-06-05
出版年2017
语种英语
摘要We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show that this interaction can limit a bidder’s ability to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments’ borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp lowers mean borrowing costs by 9-10%. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups and to illustrate and quantify how the interaction between tax policy and bidder strategic behavior determines the impact of tax advantages on municipal borrowing costs. We use the estimated model to evaluate the efficiency of Obama and Trump administration policies that limit the tax advantage for municipal bonds. Because reductions in the tax advantage inflate bidder markups and depress competition, the resulting increase in municipal borrowing costs more than offsets the tax savings to the government. Finally, we use the model to analyze a recent non-tax regulation that affects entry into municipal bond auctions.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23473
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581147
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Daniel Garrett,Andrey Ordin,James W. Roberts,et al. Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds. 2017.
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