| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23508 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23508 |
| Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage | |
| Eric Avis; Claudio Ferraz; Frederico Finan; Carlos Varjão | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-06-12 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the effects of campaign spending limits on political competition and incumbency advantage. We study a reform in Brazil that imposed limits on campaign spending for mayoral elections. These limits were implemented with a discontinuous kink which we exploit for causal identification. We find that stricter limits increase political competition by creating a larger pool of candidates that is on average less wealthy. Moreover, we find that stricter spending limits reduce the incumbency advantage, causing mayors to be less likely to be reelected. These findings are consistent with a contest model with spending caps and endogenous candidate entry. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23508 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581181 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Avis,Claudio Ferraz,Frederico Finan,et al. Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Competition and Incumbency Advantage. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23508.pdf（1561KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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