| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23586 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23586 |
| Optimal Regulation of Financial Intermediaries | |
| Sebastian Di Tella | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I characterize the optimal financial regulation policy in an economy where financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality/optimal policy in terms of observable variables, valid for heterogenous intermediaries and asset classes, and arbitrary aggregate shocks. I use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure the externality, which co-moves with the business cycle. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23586 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581260 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Di Tella. Optimal Regulation of Financial Intermediaries. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23586.pdf（1297KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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