| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w23620
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23620
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| Paternalism and Pseudo-Rationality |
| Itzik Fadlon; David Laibson
|
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-24
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| 出版年 | 2017
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| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Resource allocations are jointly determined by the actions of social planners and households. In this paper, we highlight the distinction between planner optimization and household optimization. We show that planner optimization is a partial substitute for household optimization and that this is still true when households have private in- formation about their preferences. We illustrate a novel identification problem: some aggregate equilibrium properties that are implied by household optimization are also implied by planner optimization. A rational utilitarian planner enacts policies that cause the Euler equation to hold on average in a population of non-optimizing households, which we refer to as pseudo-rationality. Hence, widely studied allocative optimality conditions also arise in an allocatively inefficient economy with a rational planner, who uses tools such as default savings and Social Security to influence the consumption choices of myopic and passive households. Accordingly, aggregate classical optimization tests implemented with data from economies with paternalistic governments cannot reveal whether households would make optimal decisions on their own. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics
; Welfare and Collective Choice
; Macroeconomics
; Public Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23620
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581294
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Itzik Fadlon,David Laibson. Paternalism and Pseudo-Rationality. 2017.
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文件名：
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w23620.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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