| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23623 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23623 |
| Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States | |
| Zack Cooper; Fiona Scott Morton; Nathan Shekita | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-24 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Hospitals and physicians independently negotiate contracts with insurers. As a result, a privately insured individual can attend an in-network hospital emergency department, but receive care and potentially a large, unexpected bill from an out-of-network emergency physician working at that hospital. Because patients do not choose their emergency physician, emergency physicians can remain out-of-network and charge high prices without losing patient volume. As we illustrate, this strong outside option improves emergency physicians’ bargaining power with insurers. We then analyze a New York State law that introduced binding arbitration between emergency physicians and insurers and therefore weakened physicians’ outside option in negotiations. We observe that the New York law reduced out-of-network billing by 34 percent and lowered in-network emergency physician payments by 9 percent. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23623 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581297 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zack Cooper,Fiona Scott Morton,Nathan Shekita. Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23623.pdf（2125KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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