| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23624 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23624 |
| The Welfare Effects of Long-Term Health Insurance Contracts | |
| Benjamin R. Handel; Igal Hendel; Michael D. Whinston | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-07-31 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Reclassification risk is a major concern in health insurance. We use a rich dataset with individual-level information on health risk to empirically study one possible solution: dynamic contracts. Empirically, dynamic contracts with one-sided commitment substantially reduce the reclassification risk present with spot contracting, achieving close to the first-best for consumers with flat net income paths. Gains are smaller for consumers with net income growth, and these consumers prefer ACA-like community rating over dynamic contracts. However, lower risk aversion, sufficient switching costs, or government insurance of pre-age-25 health risks can raise welfare with dynamic contracts above the level in ACA-like markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23624 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581298 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin R. Handel,Igal Hendel,Michael D. Whinston. The Welfare Effects of Long-Term Health Insurance Contracts. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23624.pdf（398KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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