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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w23674 |
来源ID | Working Paper 23674 |
On the Dynamics of Community Development | |
Levon Barseghyan; Stephen Coate | |
发表日期 | 2017-08-14 |
出版年 | 2017 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper presents a dynamic political economy model of community development. In each period, a community invests in a local public good. The community can grow, with new housing supplied by competitive developers. To finance investment, the community can tax residents and issue debt. In each period, fiscal decisions are made by current residents. The community's initial wealth (the value of its stock of public good less its debt) determines how it develops. High initial wealth leads to rapid development. Low initial wealth leads to gradual development that is fueled by community wealth accumulation. Wealth accumulation arises from the desire to attract more households to share the costs of the public good. The long run size of the community can be too large or too small and development may proceed too slowly. Nonetheless, some development occurs and, at all times, public good provision is efficient. |
主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23674 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581348 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Levon Barseghyan,Stephen Coate. On the Dynamics of Community Development. 2017. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w23674.pdf(491KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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