| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23686 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23686 |
| The Political Economy of Transportation Investment | |
| Edward L. Glaeser; Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Regional and Urban Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23686 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581359 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward L. Glaeser,Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto. The Political Economy of Transportation Investment. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23686.pdf（521KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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