| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23696 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23696 |
| Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions | |
| Jonathan B. Berk; Jules H. van Binsbergen | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model a market for a skill that is in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service that they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. We use this model to evaluate the standards and disclosure requirements that exist in these markets. We show that reducing the number of charlatans through regulation decreases consumer surplus. Although both standards and disclosure drive charlatans out of the market, consumers are worse off because of the resulting reduction in competition amongst producers. Producers, on the other hand, strictly benefit from the regulation, implying that the regulation we observe in these markets likely derives from producer interests. Using these insights, we study the factors that drive the cross-sectional variation in charlatans across professions. Professions with weak trade groups, skills in larger supply, shorter training periods and less informative signals regarding the professional's skill, are more likely to feature charlatans. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23696 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581369 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan B. Berk,Jules H. van Binsbergen. Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23696.pdf（3310KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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