| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w23718 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 23718 |
| What Does (Formal) Health Insurance Do, and For Whom? | |
| Amy Finkelstein; Neale Mahoney; Matthew J. Notowidigdo | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-08-21 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Health insurance confers benefits to the previously uninsured, including improvements in health, reductions in out-of-pocket spending, and reduced medical debt. But because the nominally uninsured pay only a small share of their medical expenses, health insurance also provides substantial transfers to non-recipient parties who would otherwise bear the costs of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured. The prevalence of uncompensated care helps explain the limited take-up of heavily-subsidized public health insurance and the evidence that many recipients value formal health insurance at substantially less than the cost to insurers of providing that coverage. The distributional implications of public subsidies for health insurance depend critically on the ultimate economic incidence of the transfers they deliver to providers of uncompensated care. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods ; National Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w23718 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/581389 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amy Finkelstein,Neale Mahoney,Matthew J. Notowidigdo. What Does (Formal) Health Insurance Do, and For Whom?. 2017. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w23718.pdf（412KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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